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Public Diplomacy and the Transformation of International Broadcasting
Abstract
In Media and Sovereignty, I described a variety of elements that, together, compose a foreign policy of media
space. In this article, I focus on one of the instruments of such a policy, namely international broadcasting.
Until the events of September 11, 2001 and the war in Afghanistan, there was precious little public attention to
the place of international broadcasting in the armament of external influence. Scholarly treatment of
international broadcasting has recently lagged. But international broadcasting encapsulates many of the
conflicts and difficulties that are central to understanding the need that one society may feel to shape the
information space of another. We shall see the struggle to harmonize goals of "objectivity" with the need to act
as an effective instrument of propaganda, the potential split between advancing national policy and acting as a
credible journalistic enterprise and the tension between promotion of favorable regimes and the nourishment
of dissent. International broadcasters have a range of styles, and additional styles are now emerging. Among
these are the power purposefully to alter the mix of voices in target societies, to affect the composition of their
markets for loyalties, to destabilize, to help mold opinions among their public and otherwise to assert "soft
power" for the purposes of achieving the national ends of the transmitting state.
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PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF
INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING
MONROE PRICE*
In Media and Sovereignty,l I described a variety of elements that,
together, compose a foreign policy of media space. In this article, I
focus on one of the instruments of such a policy, namely interna-
tional broadcasting. Until the events of September 11, 2001 and
the war in Mghanistan, there was precious little public attention to
the place of international broadcasting in the armament of exter-
nal influence. Scholarly treatment of international broadcasting
. has recently lagged.2 But international broadcasting encapsulates
many of the conflicts and difficulties that are central to under-
standing the need that one society may feel to shape the informa-
tion space of another. We shall see the struggle to harmonize goals
of "objectivity" with the need to act as an effective instrument of
propaganda, the potential split between advancing national policy
and acting as a credible journalistic enterprise and the tension be-
tween promotion of favorable regimes and the nourishment of dis-
sent. International broadcasters have a range of styles, and
additional styles are now emerging. Among these are the power
purposefully to alter the mix of voices in target societies, to affect
the composition of their markets for loyalties, to destabilize, to
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Kenneth Donow and Alan Heil were helpful in reading and commenting on drafts.
1 MONROE E. PRICE, MEDIA AND SOVEREIN"IY: THE GLOBAL INFORMATION REVOLUTION
AND ITs CHALLENGE TO STATE POWER (2002).
2 For treatments of legal questions raised by aspects of international broadcasting, see
Leo Gross, Some International Law Aspects of the Freedom ofInformation and the Right to Commu-
nicate, in NATIONAL SOVER~:IGN1Y AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION 208-9 (Kaarle
Nordenstrng and Herbert I. Schiller eds., 1979). See Bhagevatula Satyanarayana Murty,
PROPAGANDA AND WORLD PUIlLiC ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF THE IDEOLOGICAL IN-
STRUMENT OF COERCION (1968), reissued asTHE INTERNATIONAL LAw OF PROPAGANDA (1989);
David Marks, Broadcasting Across the Wall: 17w Free Flow of Information between East and West
Germany, J. COMM. 33, (1983); see also JOHN L. MARTIN, INTERNATIONAL PROPAGANDA: ITs
LEGAL AND DIPLOMATIC CONTROL (1958). Much of this material is cited in Stephen D. Kras-
ner, Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier, 3 WORLD POLITICS
43, 33M66, 344 (1991) to support his argument that the few international agreements that
deal with international broadcasting "are filled with the kind of confusing and contradic-
tory language that betrays underlying disagreements about principles and norms." Legal
issues are also canvassed in Jamie Frederic Metzl, Rwandan Genocide and the International
Law of Radio Jamming, 91 AM.J.INT'L L. 628 (1997).
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help mold opinions among their public and otherwise to assert
"soft power" for the purposes of achieving the national ends of the
transmitting state.
Mter September 11, there is something else. All of a sudden,
"hearts and minds," the mental and emotional kilns in which ha-
treds are stoked and positive attitudes formed, burst forth as a
meaningful and urgent battleground for large scale state concern.
Mter the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the
debate on the significance of a "clash of civilizations" was no longer
confined primarily to academic institutions. It became clear that
military responses were insufficient to counter reservoirs of in-
tensely inculcated belief that nourish future terrorists or aggressors
against the West. As part of any broader strategy, the U.S. and
other states would be required to be actively involved in the way
opinions across the world toward the West and its policies were
shaped.
Increasingly, political figures paid close attention to the mix
and content of voices in other states, concentrating on the power
of media, to be sure, but also examining such previously off-limits
areas as the nature of religious education and the policies of lead-
ership in tolerating or quietly reinforcing harshly anti-Western
speech. The discovery that minds were being honed over years in
ways unseen and unanticipated, in ways that could convert individ-
uals into instruments of violent destruction forced a response. The
United States and others re-examined the role of public diplomacy,
including international broadcasting, as tools in a long process of
counter-education and counter-programming.3
In this article, I review transformations of international broad-
casting as an element of the foreign policy of media space, focusing
3 Gary Rawnsley has made this distinction:
Public diplomacy and media diplomacy are frequently used as interchangeable
terms. [But] public diplomacy is specifically targeted at a mass audience, based
on the supposition that public opinion can exert considerable influence on
their governments and political systems ... Media diplomacy is much more
selective and aims to address a particular government or regime directly with a
view to persuading it to modify its diplomatic position or behavior.
Rawnsley uses the following example:
BBC broadcasts in English targeted at the Soviet Union during the Cold War
were never Jammed' ... This suggests that the Kremlin, complete with its own
monitoring organization, depended upon the BBC as a reliable source of diplo-
matic news, information and intelligence and, of course, as a means by which
the Soviets could learn how they and their policies were being presented and
received in the West.
Gary Rawnsley, Media Diplomacy: Monitored Broadcasts and Foreign Policy 4 (] 996). One exam-
ple of a study of this process, marked by its reliance on the work of Herbert Schiller is Fred
Fejes, Imperialism, Media and 'J1le Good Neighbor: New Deal Foreign Policy and United States Short-
wave Broadcasting to Latin America (1986).
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particularly, though not exclusively, on the United States. I con-
clude with a discussion of the impact of September 11. But to un-
derstand the limits and discourse in which immediate pressures to
change take place, other transformations must be reviewed. These
include the changes brought about by the end of the Cold War, the
domestic pressures to transform international broadcasting as a
fiercer tool of surrogacy, the responses to the ethnic conflicts
before the turn of the century, and the implications of changed
technology.
1. HISTORIES AND DEFINITIONS
International broadcasting is the elegant term for a complex
combination of state-sponsored news, information, and entertain-
ment directed at a population outside the sponsoring state's
boundaries. It is the use of electronic media by one society to
shape the opinion of the people and leaders of another. It involves
what was once with pride called propaganda.4 The Voice of
America, Deutsche Welle, and the BBC World Service are the best-
known exemplars, but the practitioners are legion. Lines, of
course, are blurred. Newer satellite services are often linked to gov-
ernment or regional policy but are not "state-sponsored" in the lit-
eral sense. There are those who argue that CNN is an instrument
of U.S. hegemony, consciously or unconsciously, but it is not an
international broadcaster in the club-like definition of the term.
Similarly AI Jazeera has been described as bearing the heavy bias of
its regional political setting, but it is not state-sponsored nor does it
appear to be state-financed.5
The category is not defined by the technology of distribution.
International "broadcasters" have traditionally used shortwave ra-
dio as a dominant mode of distributing their signals, but now many
technologies, including FM, Internet, and satellite to home, are in-
volved. A line is usually drawn between "international broadcast-
ers" that are transparently such and so-called "clandestine" or
"black" radios, instruments of information transfer that are secretly
sponsored by governments, intelligence agencies, or state-linked
political movements. There are varying styles in international
broadcasting, a British style, a French style, and one or more Amer-
ican styles (reflecting the division between U.S. sponsored broad-
4 See MARTIN, supra note 2.
5 See Fouad J\iami, What the Muslim World is Watching, NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, Nov.
18,2001, at 48.
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casters).6 These differences in style track broadcasting histories,
varying foreign policy objectives, responses to the nature of socie-
ties targeted, political involvement at home, and deep-seated do-
mestic cultural proclivities.
Histories of international broadcasting often seek to answer-
usually inconclusively-whether international broadcasting accom-
plished or assisted in the accomplishment of the goals assigned to
it. 7 Accounts of the effectiveness of international broadcasting are
often told through justificatory memoirs and rarely by the disaf-
fected. s The claims of achievement among the most avid believers
are expansive. A book by Michael Nelson, former chairman of the
Reuters Foundation, eloquently summarizes the position of many
who support international broadcasting and are confounded by
the under-appreciation of radio as a tool in altering the global po-
litical landscape. Nelson asks rhetorically, "Why did the West win
the cold war? Not by use of arms. Weapons did not breach the Iron
Curtain. The Western invasion was by radio, which was mightier
than the sword. 'Those skilled in war subdue the enemy's army
without battle,' wrote Sun Tzu."9 Among the contrarians, a former
6 These questions of style touch on ways the American approach to international
broadcasting is different, for example, from that of the United Kingdom. United States
international broadcasting was evolving into a cluster of aggressive broadcasters with spe-
cific sectoral managements. There are those who favored a television broadcasting system
that emulates the BBC World Service as a unified source of reliable, factual, and dispas-
sionate information over this cluster approach. Also, under its latest reorganization, the
VOA, together with the external radios, are subject to the Broadcasting Board of Gover-
nors, as indicated, many of whom are political appointees. Many of the members in the
1990s were advocates of the ethos of surrogacy and policy driven radio on the VOA. One
member was appointed to protect Radio and TV Marti in order to assure that the Cuban
exile community was served.
The advocates of a unified "objective" broadcaster also consider that the pressure to
transform into the surrogate function and to have a specific national political objective is
destructive to the ability of the VOA to pertixm its functions. They consider that the
proliferation of radios leads to the gratuitous duplication of resources and the use of those
resources in ways that compromise the "objectivity" of the United States international
broadcasters.
7 See ELZBIETA OLECHOWSKA AND HOWARD AsTER, CHALLENGES FOR INTERNATIONAL
BROADCASTING V (1998); DAVID M. ABSHIRE, INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING: A NEW DIMEN-
SION OF WESTERN DIPLOMACY (1976); PHILO C. WASBURN, BROADCASTING PROPAGANDA: IN-
TERNATONAL RADIO BROADCASTING AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF POLITICAL REALI'''' (1992).
There are many books that deal with these questions. See, e.g., MICHAEL NELSON, WAR OF
THE BLACK H~:AVENS: THE BATTLES OF WESTERN BROADCASTING IN TI-IE COLD WAR (1997);
PHILIP M. TAYLOR, WAR AND THE MEDIA: PROPAGANDA AND PERSUASION IN THE GULF WAR
(1992); W. LANCE BENNETT AND DAVID L. PALETZ, TAKEN By STORM: Tm: MEDIA, PUBLIC
OPINION AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN THE GULF WAR (1994); YOEL COHEN, MEDIA DIPLO-
MACY: THE FOREIGN OFFICE IN THE MASS COMMUNICATION AGE (1986); JAMES O.H. NASON,
INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING AS AN INSTRUMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY, (1977); OLIVE RENIER
AND VLADIMIR RUBINSTEIN, AsSIGNED TO LISTEN: THE EV~:SHAM EXPERIENC~: 1939-1943
(1986).
8 See Mark Hopkins, A Babel of Broadcasts, 44 COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REV. (1999).
9 See NELSON, sUjlm note 8.
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Voice of America correspondent criticizes those in Congress who
think, "simplistically that United States broadcasts of otherwise un-
available news and information poison authoritarian regimes and
fertilize the intellectual, if not revolutionary soil so that western
democratic ideals and free markets will blossom." I () In 1927 Harold
Lasswell wrote: "The truth is that all governments are engaged to
some extent in propaganda as part of their ordinary peace-time
functions. They make propaganda on behalf of diplomatic friends
or against diplomatic antagonists and this is unavoidable."ll
The Voice of America, through World War II, was the symbol
of U.S. international broadcasting. In the post war era, as a re-
sponse to the Cold War, a group of U.S. citizens, with CIA backing
and ultimately virtually full CIA funding, the surrogate radios, then
called Radio Free Europe (targeting Central and Eastern Europe)
and Radio Liberation (targeting the Soviet Union) came into exis-
tence. For a very long time, the Radios maintained that they were
wholly independent of the government, privately funded, and, un-
til the issue was fo'rced, the government denied its clandestine rela-
tionship to it. Later, the Radios merged (Radio Liberation became
Radio Liberty) and the federal government acknowledged its fi-
nancing role. The advantages of the two (increasingly similar)
styles-VOA "full service" broadcasting (largely telling America's
story to the world) and the Radios' highly targeted surrogate style
(narrating for the targeted society an account of events transpiring
there)-have been debated in Congress for several decades, and
this intensified when resources became scarcer in the post-Soviet
period.
The depth of public interest in international broadcasting is
cyclical. In the early 1960s, President Kennedy sought to build up
Voice of America broadcasting for the "peaceful evolution" of so-
cialist countries. The President aimed to make the broadcasts "leap
national borders and the oceans, the 'Iron Curtain' and stone
walls, in a life-and-death competition with communism."l2 A U.S.
Congress report then noted, "Radio broadcasting is a most valuable
means of promoting foreign policy....We need to re-acknowledge
the strategic role of broadcast stations, considering our strategic
superiority, to conscientiously reappraise radio broadcasting....
Radio broadcasting is the only way to overthrow socialism."13 Dur-
ing one of the many congressional subcommittee discussions con-
10 See Hopkins, sUjJra note 8.
11 HAROLD D. LASSWELL, PROPAGANDA TECHNIQUE IN THE WORLD WAR 14 (1927).
12 China Accuses BBC of Launching "Invasion ZHONGLIU", Beijing, June 12, 1999.
13 Id.
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cerning support for Radio Free Europe, Representative Edward J.
Derwinski stated that "the American people must be educated to
think of the radios as weapons?albeit nonlethal?key elements in
our national security."14
The Cold War was a time when international broadcasting
raised specific issues of negotiation, unilateralism, and multilateral
agreement in affecting media space. When the use of ideologically
inspired radio broadcasting was at its height in the Cold War, the
United States maintained a strong condemnation of radiojamming
technology in many contexts, a legal position that still exists and is
invoked. Jamming is the blocking of programming through co-
channeling on the same frequencies or the "deliberate use of inter-
fering radio signals sent from one or more transmitters to garble
emissions from other transmitters in order to make them unintel-
ligible at reception."1:' The United States and the West generally
claimed that their right to broadcast putatively objective radio pro-
grams abroad meant that an interference with these transmissions
was a breach of international law in terms of both specific radio
conventions and broader rights of free expression. 16 With respect
to the older technologies, the Soviets and the Cubans had quite a
different understanding. To them, and to many developing coun-
tries, state sovereignty precluded such undesirable foreign trans-
missions, and jamming was, and for Cuba remains, an often-used
countermeasure. 17
The legal status of jamming has been much discussed, espe-
cially in connection with Radio Marti and disputes between Cuba
and the United States over the legality of US broadcasts and subse-
quent retaliations. 18 In the case of Cuba and the United States, le-
gal relations were established by the North America Radio
Broadcasting Agreement (NARBA) , which became effective in
1960. It is a "treaty among certain North American countries pro-
viding a system of priorities and engineering standards designed to
14 Jon T. Powell, Towards a Negotiable Definition of Propaganda for International Agreements
Related to Direct Broadcast Satellites, 45 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 25-6 (1982).
15 JOI-IN B. WHITTON AND ARTHUR D. LARSON, PROPAGANDA TOWARDS DISARMAMENT IN
THE WAR OF WORDS 210 (1964).
16 See MARTIN, supra note 2, at 87,223.
17 Bruce Kessler, Politics Among the Airwaves: An Analysis of Soviet and Western Perspectives
on International Broadcasting and the Right to Jo.xchange Ideas and Information Regardless ofFron-
tiers, 7 Hous. .J. INT'L L. 237, 248 (1985).
18 Stephen D. Bayer, The Legal Aspects of TV Marti in Relation to the Law ofDirect Broadcast-
ing Satellites, 41 EMORY L. J. 541 (1992); see also Omar Javier Arcia, War Over the Airwaves: A
Comparative Analysis of u.s. and Cuban Views on International Law and Policy Governing Trans-
national Broadcasts, 5 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'y 199 (1996); L. ALEXANDRE, Television Marti:
"Open Skies" Over the South, in BEYOND NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY, (K. Nordenstren and Herber
Schiller eds., 1993).
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minimize interference and to promote the orderly use of the AM
channels in the North American region."19 NARBA established
power levels at which broadcasting stations were required to oper-
ate to avoid objectionable interference. In addition the ITU Radio
Regulations have provided that the shortwave band is "the interna-
tionally accepted method in which information can be transmitted
across national borders," while the AM band is for domestic use.
Radio Marti operates on the shortwave and AM band.
The U.S. basis for Radio Marti's operation is declared in Sec-
tion 2 of the Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act of 1983, which pro-
vides (1) that it is the policy of the United States to support the
right of the people of Cuba to seek, receive, and impart informa-
tion and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers, in
accordance with Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights; (2) that, consonant with this policy, radio broadcasting to
Cuba may be effective in furthering the open communication of
accurate information and ideas to the people of Cuba, in particu-
lar, information about Cuba; and (3) that such broadcasting to
Cuba, operated in a manner not inconsistent with the broad policy
of the United States and in accordance with high professional stan-
dards, would be in the national interest.2o It is interesting that built
into the justification is the reference to Article 19 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights that grants all people the freedom
"to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any
media and regardless of frontiers." Despite the assertion, it is not
clear that Article 19 provides any government the affirmative right
to make information and ideas available to whomever it chooses on
the basis that the host government is engaged in a deprivation of
the right.
II. TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE WAKE OF THE COLD WAR
As the Cold War ended and with it the established basis for
this ethereal penetration of sovereign borders, fundamental geo-
political change has required the reconfiguration of international
broadcasting as new targets, new justifications, and new purposes
were explored. Until resuscitated by the war on terrorism, interna-
tional broadcasting underwent a deep crisis of purpose and credi-
bility in the mid-1990s. Budget considerations, new technologies,
19 Region 2 Administrative Radio Conference on Medium Wave Frequency (MF) Broadcasting:
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Operations of the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs. House Comm. on Foreign Affairs. 97th Congo (1981) (statement ofJames L. Buckley).
20 Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act of 1983 § 2. 3(b), 22 V.S.c. §1465 (2003).
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and new industrial modes of distributing information were influen-
tial in the reassessment process.
During this time, Canada and Australia came close to eliminat-
ing external broadcasting. The Australians had a lesser involve-
ment in classic European Cold War politics, and instead, had
specialized as a major source of information in Southeast Asia and
Oceania. Still, as would be true in the United States, Australian
external broadcasting was the victim of a general budget cutting
process. Australian commercial broadcasters also objected to the
continuation of the service. Australian companies, like those of the
media mogul Kerry Packer, sought to extend their sphere of influ-
ence into places such as Vietnam and Cambodia where interna-
tional services operated. Ultimately, after Australian troops took a
dominant position in peacekeeping in East Timor, and after an ef-
fective public outcry at home, Radio Australia's budget was re-
stored and, to some extent, expanded. A unique effort to couple
an Australian international television broadcasting presence in co-
operation with a subsidized commercial channel failed, with inter-
national radio becoming the favored survivor.21 In Canada the
budget cuts were more lasting. 22
In 1999, Deutsche Welle, the German external broadcaster,
was required, also for budget reasons, to dismiss staff for the first
time since 1949. In October 1999, its Director announced a new
strategy for DW in light of these budget cuts. The principles de-
clared were similar to changes marked for many other external
broadcasters. Radio broadcasts would continue for regions with sig-
nificant information deficiencies (broadcasting to the Balkans
would continue and programs for Indonesia and crisis areas in Af-
rica and Asia would be expanded). DW Radio would be discontin-
ued in liberalized regions that were well served by privatized
information markets (Japanese language programming for Japan
and Spanish radio programs for Latin America were therefore cut).
DW television would be maintained and Internet offerings ex-
panded. As a kind of plaintive cry, the Director justified DW's exis-
tence because "growing Anglo-American media domination
requires consistent offering of foreign language services and in-
21 New OjJerator of Aussie TV to be Decided Soon, JAKARTA POST, Apr. 9, 2001.
22 To maintain and reinforce il~ service, the management at Radio Canada Interna-
tional made a conscious decision to be part of "Team Canada." These are assortments of
business and industrial leaders sent to various countries to promote goods and services.
RCI determined that Team Canada activities, "rather than just being a news story, were an
integral part of reflecting what's happening in Canada." Radio Canada International plans for
1999, (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Jan. I, 1999), World Broadcast Information,
China, \NBlj0001/WB.
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creased international cooperation."23
In the United Kingdom, after outliving the spasms of fascism,
the Cold War, and decolonization, it became necessary for the BBC
World Service to find a more inclusive definition for its long-term
purposes. In 1993 John Tusa, the outspoken former head of the
enterprise, argued that international broadcasting from the United
Kingdom should not "turn on the hinge of a particular political
dispute or ideological difference, nor one particular period of his-
tory or the immediate needs of a particular part of the globe." De-
fining the criteria for a sustained World Service, he added: "It must
be relevant to all audiences worldwide .... It must appeal to a
global rather than an elite audience. It must be 'international'
rather than foreign." The Service's broadcasts, Tusa wrote, can do
a multiplicity of different things for different people. "In part, the
broadcasts operate like aid, transferring knowledge and skills; they
have an element of cultural advertisement; they are an instrument
of informal diplomacy; they. bring individuals in touch with a
nation."24
Threatened cuts in the early 1980s nearly forced the closure of
BBC services like the Burmese, though it typified the function most
readily justified, providing transmissions to people whose oppres-
sive governments deprived them of access to other reliable sources
of news. Later in the decade capital budgets actually increased, en-
abling a dramatic improvement in transmission facilities, and a
consequent jump in the listening figures. With the collapse of com-
munism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, as with the Amer-
ican Radios, the Service redefined opportunity and found itself
with another new role, namely assisting in transitions in the old
Soviet bloc. Attentive to warnings not to allow itself to become too
defined by particular disputes or historical events, the BBC World
Service survived the passing of the global crisis of confidence with
almost all its European services intact.25
In the U.S., the invention and growth of CNN caused some to
raise monetary objections to the continued existence of such enti-
ties as the Voice of America and the so-called surrogate radios.26
23 DW Seroices and Staff Cuts Outlined, (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Oct. 15,
1999), World Broadcast Information, \VBI/0042/WB.
24 John Tusa, Media: Britannia Rules the Airwaves, THE INDEPENDENT, Dec. 9, 1992, at 19.
25 Peter Popham, The Empire Talks Back, INDEPENDENT MAGAZINE, Jan. 17, 1996, at 2.
26 CNN broadcasts largely in English, though that was changing. British and U.S. inter-
national broadcasters broadcast in more than 65 languages and reach mass audiences
(more than 200 million readers/listeners/viewers a week),·notjust the affluent who can
afford television. See DON M. FLOURNOY AND ROBERT K. STEWART, CNN: MAKING NEWS IN
THE GLOBAL MARKET (1997).
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Mter the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the once-vigorous
Russian international broadcasting efforts deteriorated markedly.
Shortly after coming to office, President Bill Clinton called for the
consolidation of all U.S. international broadcasting. This was a low
point in the prospects for international radio. Consolidation was to
be an opportunity to reduce budgets, rethink missions, and ques-
tion assumptions. Under his initial proposal, the budget of Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) would be slashed, as a prel-
ude to later elimination of the Radios. On April 30, 1994, the Presi-
dent signed into law the U.S. International Broadcasting Act. The
Voice of America and the Radios, including Radio Marti, would
report to the International Broadcasting Bureau within what was
the soon-to-be-abolished United States Information Agency
(USIA) .27 In obeisance to history, the surrogates, RFE/RL and Ra-
dio Free Asia, reported directly to the Bureau's Board of Governors
as privately incorporated, federally funded grantees. Their employ-
ees were not part of the U.S. civil service as were those of other
components, the VOA and Radio-TV Marti, for example. The legis-
lation also authorized the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG)
to oversee the Broadcasting Bureau, establish and maintain broad-
casting standards, set broadcast priorities of the different language
services, and assess the quality, effectiveness, and professional in-
tegrity of all activities. Typical of the mood of the time, the act,
ominously, expressed the sense of Congress that the private sector
should assume all funding for the radios not later than the end of
fiscal year 1999.
The tenor of government and society was far less supportive
than it would be less than a decade later. In the mid 1990s the
institutions of international broadcasting were under pressure
from the great private media moguls and their political counter-
parts. They argued that international broadcasting was unnecessary
in the "age of CNN." The Radios and the VOA were, together, con-
sidered gold-plated Cold War relics, with high salaries and an obso-
lete mission. That year, too, the President certified that significant
national interest required relocating the operations of RFE/RL
from Munich, Germany, to Prague in the Czech Republic.
In the face of this effective opposition, the Radios began to
rethink their missions. No longer facing an authoritarian regime
where they served as surrogates expressing the views of dissenters,
they created a new role for themselves: facilitating transitions. The
Radios' missions, they claimed, had evolved from the purely surro-
27 United States International Broadcasting Act. Pub. L. No. 103-236, tit. III (1994).
HeinOnline -- 21 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 61 2003
2003] PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 61
gate task of providing news and analysis on internal events where
no such media were available, to compensating for the limitations
of domestic media and setting a standard by which emerging free
media could judge themselves.
RFE/RL asserted three primary missions for itself in the tran-
sition period: (1) to act as a traditional broadcaster by providing
information and news on important issues such as democracy and
political organization, the environment, and economic growth; (2)
to provide assistance to indigenous radio stations; and (3) to train
indigenous radio personnel and broadcasters. RFE/RL offered it-
self as a "model of Western journalism, an alternative news source,
and insurance against resurgent government censorship abroad."
It developed bureaus in all former Eastern European target coun-
tries and the former Soviet republics and rebroadcast on stations
licensed within those states.
Geoffrey Cowan, then director of the Voice of America, articu-
lated the VOA's comparable purposes in 1996 as follows: to help
transform authoritarian societies, to encourage freedom of media
as practiced in the United States, to foster appreciation for U.S.
values, to increase educational opportunities, to explain US poli-
cies to the world and to serve U.S. culture, trade, and tourism. In-
creasingly, the mission of the Radios overlapped with that of the
Voice of America, causing growing friction and competition be-
tween the constituents of the International Broadcasting Bureau.
The mood of the times would affect bureaucratic 'predilec-
tions. Lobbying groups and public officials favored "surrogacy" or a
more hard-hitting approach by tax-supported international broad-
casting institutions. This bias tipped ardor and revenue, ardor's
manifestation, to the Radios over the Voice of America. On Octo-
ber 30, 1997, two new U.S. funded radio services to Iran and Iraq
began transmitting.28 Produced by RFE/RL, these services
originated in Prague. The service to Iran was originally to be called
Radio Free Iran and had its political sources in Congress rather
than in the State Department. In May 1997, after the election of
President Khatami, the State Department sought to postpone or
cancel the Iranian service as part of a general diplomatic overture.
By April 1998, the State Department, under intense congressional
pressure fostered by RFE/RL and those who favored the surrogate
approach, justified the new service as designed to enrich domestic
28 VOA has been broadcasting to Iraq in Arabic for more than half a century and to
Iran in a restored Farsi Service since 1979.
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political debate inside the country and not to undermine the
government.
As a semantic manifestation of this delicately articulated pur-
pose, the authorities agreed to change the name of the new entity
from Radio Free Iran to the Persian-language service of RFE/RL.
This importance of nomenclature would repeat itself, as we shall
see with Radio Free Asia. In the case of Radio Democracy in Africa,
original Congressional pressure had been for a surrogate named
Radio Free Africa. This was avoided in favor of a VOA division;
rather than have an ethic of "opposition" or dissent, the African
service would engage in conflict prevention or conflict resolution
and "civic reporting and civic building" where there were "moves
toward democracy." The service would adhere to the VOA charter
commitment to general objectivity and impartiality, and the news-
casts were to be VOA-determined.29
The implications of global change and increased private com-
petition on the Radios can be seen in the emphases for the contin-
uation of national services as articulated by Congress:
It is the sense of Congress that Radio Free Europe and Radio
Liberty should continue to broadcast to the peoples of Central
Europe, Eurasia, and the Persian Gulf until such time as (1) a
particular nation has clearly demonstrated the successful estab-
lishment and consolidation of democratic rule, and (2) its do-
mestic media which provide balanced, accurate, and
comprehensive news and information, is firmly established and
widely accessible to the national audience, thus making redun-
dant broadcasts by Radio Free Europe or Radio Liberty. At such
time as a particular nation meets both of these conditions, RFE/
RL should phase out broadcasting to that nation.30
III. TRANSFORMATIONS AND RADIO FREE AsIA
Radio Free Asia is a case study in the focused effort to trans-
form international broadcasting to affect information space in tar-
get countries. 3 \ This surrogate service, established in the U.S.
International Broadcasting Act of 1994, was designed to target
China, Vietnam, Burma, Laos, Cambodia, and North Korea.32 RFA
29 DelaiLI of New Radio Democracy for Africa, (Voice of America radiobroadcast, Apr. ]],
]998).
30 22 U.S.C. 6211.
3\ This section is based on research done by Dr. Michael Likosky during graduate work
at the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, University of Oxford.
32 As a historic matter, a surrogate service directed at China had previously existed
from 195] to 1953.
Radio Free Asia, an allegedly public-supported (but in reality, CIA-financed)
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is a modern iteration of Cold War use of the airwaves, emphasizing
a turn from the traditional Cold War targets to new ones. The de-
bates about Radio Free Asia echo those about other surrogate ra-
dios. These debates are important within the United States, as well,
because of a general shift to purposeful, designated and sharper-
edged surrogate approaches.
Radio Free Asia is also an example of another hypothesis: in-
struments of international broadcasting are a reflection of the pri-
orities and internal politics of the sending nation. Most foreign
policy, it is said, including international broadcasting, can be de-
scribed as shaped by domestic politics.33 There are a number of
themes in the RFA story that illustrate the relationship between do-
mestic politics in the United States and the design of international
broadcasting. For example, what emerges from the debate is the
introduction of Radio Free Asia as a domestic trade-off to build
support' for "most-favored-nation" treatment for China. In the
1990s, when there were numerous objections to China's human
rights policies and a liberalized trade policy was held hostage to a
more aggressive attitude toward China, RFA was a convenient tech-
nique for gaining votes: those who favored free trade could
demonstrate their loyalty through the fist of radio while at the
same time facilitating the glove of opening economic markets.
Aside from the debate over trade, much of the Congressional
debate that focused on Radio Free Asia was about the nature and
purpose of international broadcasting. Often Congressional state-
ments focused on such questions as the similarities and differences
between China in the 1990s and Eastern Europe of the late 1940s
to 1960s. Advocates of RFA recited the account of the end of the
Cold War that assigned a major role to the impact of Radio Free
Europe and Radio Liberty in bringing about the fall of Soviet do-
minion. Opponents responded that whereas the European socie-
ties under Soviet rule were ostensibly "tightly closed," today a
"flood of information reaches China."34 European listeners risked
their lives to listen to RFE, while it was contended that in China,
international broadcasting station operated out of San Francisco, but transmit-
ting from Manila, was founded, Its dual mission was to strengthen resistance
within China to the new Communist government plus prevent overseas China
in Asia from 'falling victim to communist Chinese propaganda.'
JOHN A. LENT, BROADCASTING IN AsIA AND THE PACIFIC: A CONTINENTAL SURVEY OF RADIO
AND TELEVISION (1978). The creation of RFA was once again debated during the Vietnam
War. CRS Report for Congress, Radio Free Asia, Jan. 2, 1997.
33 JAMES N. ROSENAU, DOMESTIC SOURC:~:S OF FOREIGN POLICY (1967).
34 US ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY, DIPLOMACY IN THE INFORMATION
AGE, 15 (1993).
[d. at 30.
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leadership policing was not so strict.35
Opponents of RFA argued that the best strategy to combat
human rights abuses and to institute political freedom and democ-
racy in Asia was by focusing on economic engagement. U.S. credi-
bility in Beijing, they claimed, would be undermined by the
establishment of RFA because "the PRC leadership would see crea-
tion of a Home Service radio as confirming that the United States
follows a policy of attempting to displace them by promoting
'peaceful evolution."'36 Such a response would "undercut U.S. in-
fluence and our ability to moderate People of Republic of China
policies to which we object."37 Finally, opponents denied the claim
that the Chinese people did not have any available source of news
about domestic affairs. They asserted that informal alternative
sources of domestic news were abundant in China.38
Proponents hoped that RFA might provide the "hope and
knowledge needed to change conditions in China" by fostering an
increased "understanding of the meaning of political and eco-
nomic freedom and democracy" and thus forcing "the Chinese
government to allow greater measures of each."39 In arguments
claiming a special obligation on the part of Americans to support
democracy and freedom abroad, the proponents stressed that RFA
was necessary to "show our commitment to these countries' citi-
zens."40 Some went so far as to say "the fate of America is inter-
twined with [propagating or advancing] the faith of American
ideals."4\ Others made a more strategic argument on behalf of
35 [d.
36 ld. at 26.
37 [d. The Commission established by President Bush summarized the argument as
follows:
China's growing participation in the global economy's already having the effect
of opening its society to outside influences, with inevitable demands for in-
creased democracy. We encourage these trends but the creation of a new and
separate 'surrogate' broadcasting system-which would be seen as a hostile
American act-is not an effective means of accomplishing that objective.
38 [d.
39 DIPLOMACY, supra note 35.
40 140 CONGo REC., 54819-02, 52420 (statement of Sen. Biden).
41 140 CONGo REC. H5 11 3-04, H5125 (statement of Rep. Porter). Congressman Smith
argued for the primacy of ideas as follows:
Just let me say that throughout human history, the most important battles have
not been those whose object was to control territory. The battles that really
matter have always been about values and ideas. When the history of our cen-
tury is written it will be large part the story of a long struggle for the soul of the
world, the struggle between the values of the free world on the one hand and
those of communism, fascism, and other forms of totalitarianism on the other.
Throughout most of the world, the values of the free world have been victori-
ous, not only because we had better values but also because we were not afraid
to stand up for them.
142 CONGo REC. H8215-o3, H8228 (statement by Rep. Smith).
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RFA, claiming "that the spread of democratic ideas serves the inter-
ests of the United States because democracies are far less prone to
launch wars ofaggression."42 For this reason RFA would serve "[a]s
a prime vehicle for the dissemination of democratic ideas" creating
"a cost-efficient, nonviolent means of communication."43 Some ar-
gued that RFA was not only the most efficient means for democrati-
zation and prevention of physical destruction but also for saving
money, feeling that due to budget restraints, "it is cheaper to fight
some of these conflicts and wars with words rather than
weapons."44
The debate exposed fault lines between supporters and oppo-
nents of the Voice of America as compared to the approach of the
surrogates. Partly this was a philosophical debate over goals and
methods, over what U.S. international broadcasting should be like.
But it was also a struggle over declining resources. Advocates of the
Voice believed that the creation of RFA would lead to a propor-
42 140 CONGo REc. H5125 (statement of Rep. Bentley).
43 Id. See also 140 CONGo REc. H5131 (statement of Rep. Porter). Such a strategic stance
was discussed in the context of particular countries; for instance Cambodia, Vietnam and
North Korea, as articulated by Bentley, H5125-H5126:
In Cambodia, 15 months after historic elections were held, the Chinese-backed
Khmer Rouge were again on the offensive-waging war over the airwaves, as
inflammatory news broadcasts by Pol Pot's forces need only refer to the Foreign
Broadcast Information Service reports that many of our offices receive on a
daily basis. The growing political chaos, fuelled by Khmer Rouge broadcasts,
should be of serious concern to all who remember what happened inside Cam-
bodia from 1975-1978. Radio Free Asia can playa positive role in helping Cam-
bodia consolidate its tentative move toward democracy that is in danger of
being suppressed again by the murderous Khmer Rouge.
In Vietnam, a country of 70 million people, the VOA broadcasts 2 1/2 hours
a day-certainly not enough for a country of such pivotal regional importance.
In Vietnam, economic liberalization has not necessarily been followed by politi-
cal liberalization. Yet, although the Vietnamese government continues to pro-
hibit free expression, there has been a range of nascent, democratic activities
that must be nourished through access to a Radio Free Asia. Although the Con-
gress has lifted economic sanctions, we must not falsely assume that trade, by
itself, will foster democracy. \\'hile the VOA gives these countries a window to
world events, a Radio Free Asia will address a full and fair colloquy of events of
the day within each country and culture.
Then, there is the case of North Korea, a closed, militaristic society that
has the potential to foment major instability throughout the region. In a closed
society such as North Korea, international radio broadcasting is extremely im-
pOl·tant for another key reason-communication with the ruling elite. Contrary
to the belief that North Korean leaders are of only one mind, we know from
past events that there are moderate as well as hardline factions. Make no mis-
take about it, members of the ruling elite can and do listen to international
radio broadcasts-perhaps behind closed doors-but listening nonetheless.
Kim II-song will not live forever, and the succession is not clear. Through Radio
Free Asia, we can implant the notion that a peaceful future is possible, with as
much as the North Korean elite as can be reached: Must we wait for the out-
break of a second war on the Korean Peninsula before recognizing the need
for a Radio Free Asia?
44 140 CONGo REC. (statement of Rep. Hughes).
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tional cut in VOA services. In the midst of this battle, VOA submit-
ted a compromise plan in which it would satisfy the need for
"surrogate service"-type broadcasting. This plan was based on the
assumptions: (1) that, unlike VOA, RFA would require a "new
structure and staff'; (2) that VOA already had a audience, and it
would take years for RFA to "find an audience and establish credi-
bility with a loyal listenership"; and (3) that augmenting VOA
would be "a much more efficient and less expensive way" of accom-
plishing the objectives; that VOA, even though many assert it fo-
cuses only on "news from the United States and international
developments" and cannot do targeted broadcasting, has demon-
strated that it is capable of providing specialized programming.45
Despite the numerous objections, the International Broadcast-
ing Act of 1994 brought the RFA into being and provided for its
support.46 RFA's obligation was to furnish a service for Asian coun-
tries "which lack adequate sources of free information," in a way
that would "enhance the promotion of information and ideas,
while advancing the goals of U.S. foreign policy."47 The legislation
listed target countries: the People's Republic of China, Burma (My-
anmar), Cambodia, Laos, North Korea, Tibet, and Vietnam.48
Under the Act, the "surrogate" function of RFA was specified, that
is, to construct a service that would give "accurate and timely infor-
mation, news, and commentary about events in the respective
countries of Asia and elsewhere and be a forum for a variety of
opinions and voices from within Asian nations whose people do
not fully e~oy freedom of expression."49
In May 1994 the President announced that renewal of most-
favored nation status (MFN) was contingent upon increased "inter-
national broadcasting."50 Soon thereafter, he suggested that talks
on reducing the Chinese jamming of Voice of America were pro-
gressing:';) In March 1995, the BBG attempted to rename the RFA
as the, Asia Pacific Network. The attempt angered some in Con-
45 fri. See also 142 CONGo REC. H5113-04 and H5125 (statement of Rep. Smith).
46 United States International Broadcasting Act of 1994, 22 U.S.C.A. § 6201 et seq.
( 1994).
47 fd.
48 See id. at § 6208(a) 1. In order to receive a grant, Congress required that the Board
submit "to Congress a detailed plan for the establishment and operation of Radio Free
A~ia." See id. at § 6208(c) 1. This plan must include how RFA will meet its funding limita-
tions, the number and qualitications of its employees, and how it will meet its technical
capabilities. See id. at § 6208 (c)l (A), (B) and (C).
49 fd. at § 6208(b)1 and (b)2.
50 Exec. Order No. 12,850, 3 C.F.R. 606-607.
,,1 President's Letter to Congressional Leaders on Most-Favored Nation Trade Status
for China, 20 WEEKLV COMPo PRES. Doc. 1203 Oune 2, 1994).
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gress who thought the radio was meant to be confrontational and
so should keep the name "Radio Free Asia." The original name was
restored.52 In September 1996, broadcasts began in Mandarin into
China and soon thereafter a Tibetan language service was added.53
In 1997 broadcasts were begun to Myanmar, Vietnam, and North
Korea. In 1996 and 1997 the debate over MFN status to China was
renewed, and RFA again became an important bargaining chip.
Representative Porter introduced legislation to make RFA a twenty-
four hour a day service, as a kind of relief valve for opposition to
continued extensive trade relationships with China. The President
and Speaker supported the legislation.
The international debate over the broadcast of RFA took on
the character of many past battles over U.S. international broad-
casting to older target sites including the Soviet Union and Cuba.
On the one hand, the United States argued that its privilege to
broadcast was contained within Article 19 of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights giving everyone the right "to seek, receive,
and impart information and ideas through any media and regard-
less of frontiers."54 These arguments assumed, as has already been
mentioned, that the "right" of individuals in target countries gave
the United States the correlative power or duty under the interna-
tional legal regime, to satisfy legal and informational disabilities
that such individuals might have. China, Korea, and Vietnam ar-
gued that such broadcasting violates international tenets and
agreements on domestic sovereignty.
In terms of response, accounts from the societies RFA was de-
signed to reach include (1) a critique of the free flow of informa-
tion argument as being instead a form of cultural imperialism, or
(2) claims that the broadcasting efforts violate domestic sover-
eignty. In China, for example, the Foreign Ministry spokesman
said:
We demand the United States not interfere further in other
countries' internal affairs by using the excuse of freedom of
speech.... It is obvious that the Free Asia Radio is a tool of
psychological war, a typical tool of the Cold War period, and at
52 The authorizing law stated: "such broadcast service shall be referred to as Radio Free
Asia." CRS Report, 5.
53 The first RFA broadcast took place on September 29, 1996, broadcasting into China
in Mandarin. The initial broadcasts of one hour at 7:00 a.m. and one hour at 11 :00 p.m.
include regional news and feature stories. The 7:00 a.m. broadcasts consist of a half hour
program that is repeated at 7:30 a.m., 11 :00 p.m., and 11:30 p.m., with updated news ad-
ded to each half hour. Broadcasting into China is expected to double by the end of the
1996 calendar year. CRS Report, 3.
54 22 U.S.C. § 6201.
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the same time a direct interference in the internal affairs of
Asian nations. In other words, the Radio Free Asia is a form of
cultural colonialism.55
The China Youth Daily reported:
Although the Cold War has been over for years, the United
States and other Western nations rely on the superiority of their
communication and information technology to increasingly
launch Cold War propaganda.... The real goal of setting up
Radio 'Free Asia' is to use news media to interfere in the inter-
nal affairs of China and other Asian nations, to create chaos,
and to destroy the stability of these countries.56
In 1999, a report from China attacked VOA's increased broadcast-
ing in Tibetan as a new escalation in the U.S. radio infiltration of
China.
A look at a series of most recent actions in U.S. broadcasts
against China shows the new United States "smokeless war" strat-
egy. The United States has gradually installed around China a se-
ries of relay stations and transmitters ... United States officials
asserted that, "these ... relay stations enable all of mainland China
to hear the VOA," "making Beijing's jamming ineffective." Mter
President Nixon's 1972 visit to China, particularly after the estab-
lishment of Sino-United States diplomatic relations, United States
officials in charge of foreign propaganda maintained that: this was
the arrival of "an absolutely unprecedented opportunity since 1949
to really subject China to Western ideological influences and val-
ues." So we need to seize the "unprecedented good" opportunity,
launching propaganda against China, to make up "its gap in West-
ern ideology and values." The VOA has adjusted its programming
in line with changing circumstances on one hand, while going all
out to expand its real broadcasting might against China on the
other.
Similar statements emanated from North Korea. Shortly after
the initiation of Radio Free Asia in 1994, a spokesman for the
DPRK Foreign Ministry objected to the legislation and stated,
Passage of the bill ... is a criminal act of interfering in the inter-
nal affairs of and hostility against our country and other Asian
countries.... The true intention of the United States in initiat-
ing Radio Free Asia is to infuse the so-called United States style
5.5 Hanoi accuses RFA of 'cultural colonialism, Oct. 4, 1996, available in LEXIS News Library,
BBCSWB file.
Ml Mure Disckie, China Media Lambast US over Propaganda, Politics, REUTERS WORLD SER-
VICE, Nov. 1, 1996.
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democratic values and the toxin of bourgeois ideology into our
country and other Asian countries in order to crush socialism in
this region and demolish the independent governments there
from within. The United States was able to use this machination
and propaganda effectively to demolish from within the former
socialist countries in another region in the past and to have
them turn to capitalism, but it is far from workable in our
country.57
Another typical passage objecting to Radio Free Asia is as
follows:
The U.S. plan to establish an Asian Pacific broadcast to control
our people with Korean-language broadcasts is as foolish an act
as attempting to crush a rock with an egg. The U.S. maneuvers
to establish an Asian Pacific broadcast cannot be anything but a
childish farce [yuchihan norum] that will only bring disgrace in
the United States. It is better for the United States to maintain
relations with Asian countries through a sound way of thinking,
instead of adhering to shabby slanderous broadcast propaganda.
This is also the demand of the United States people. The United
States should not kick up a useless racket.58
Arguments from Vietnam had much the same tone. Nhan Dan,
a leading Vietnamese newspaper, strongly criticized radio efforts of
the United States, saying they were detrimental to the recent ef-
forts to improve Vietnamese-United States relations. In a commen-
tary, the paper called the U.S. efforts to open Radio Free Asia "a
move to renew the psychological warfare in the Cold War period,
using the pretext of democracy and human rights to launch a war
of ideological and cultural invasions and interfere into Asian coun-
tries' internal affairs." The papers said that from the idea of its es-
tablishment to preparations for the start of is broadcasts, "Radio
Free Asia has exposed itself as a wicked political instrument and a
product of the Cold War period," which is designed "to oppose
socialist countries, including Vietnam."59
The second, related set of arguments against RFA from Asian
countries focuses on the international legal framework for national
sovereignty, as well as political rhetoric emerging from this frame-
work. A Vietnam radio commentary against Radio Free Asia is one
such example:
57 Foreign Ministry Spokesman Berates Plan for Radio Free Asia, Central Broadcasting Station
broadcast, Feb. I, 1994, available in LEXIS News Library, BBCSWB file.
58 Radio Condemns US Plan to Set up Radio Free Asia, broadcast from Central Broadcasting
Station, (Oct. 11,1996), available in LEXIS, News Library, BBCSWB file.
59 Vietnamese Newspaper Raps US Radio, XINHUA NEWS ACENL"Y, Dec. 7, 1996.
HeinOnline -- 21 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 70 2003
70 CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT [Vol. 21:51
One of the fundamental principles of international law is the
principle of respect for national sovereignty. In existing interna-
tional law, this principle has become a rule and a condition al-
ready engraved in almost all important international legal
documents, especially in the U.N. Charter and in various docu-
ments of the U.N. General Assembly, by which all nations have
full and ultimate authority to make decisions on foreign and do-
mestic policies. Therefore, the use of Radio Free Asia by the
United States to spread its propaganda and impose its political
will, and to pressure other countries into changing their na-
tional policies and lines constitutes a violation of the sacred sov-
ereignty of these countries.no
In the official Quan Doi Nhan Dan (People's Army) newspaper,
the United States was accused "of seeking to undermine stability in
Asia, but also expos [ing] deeper sores from a war that ended
nearly 22 years ago." The paper went on to say:
You [the United States] should know that for the Vietnamese
people, for a long time, whenever the adjective free is used by
you it implies no beautiful meaning ... The Vietnamese people
don't want to repeat that whenever the adjective free has been
applied to us by you, it's linked with 'free aggression,' 'freely
bombing,' 'freely spraying toxic chemicals,' 'freely killing and
jailing patriotic people,' 'freely distorting the truth' ... and
'freely interfering in the internal affairs of sovereign
countries. '61
IV. TRANSFORMATIONS AND INFORMATION INTERVENTION
Transformations in international broadcasting were also occa-
sioned by the ethnic conflicts that closed the twentieth century. I
have discussed the complicated balance the international commu-
nity seeks to find as it alters media space to prevent future conflict
and the potential for genocide. Training journalists, fostering new
voices, and sparking local, indigenous media are all steps toward
increasing stability and enhancing the plurality and diversity of po-
litical participation. But there are contexts where the ground for
these more advanced measures was barren. In countries such as
Cambodia and Rwanda, at particular times, the deployment of in-
ternational radios may be a major mechanism for introducing a
mood hospitable to peace or to help initiate useful political shifts.
GO Radio Says Revival ofRadio Free Asia Violates International Law, Voice of Vietnam broad-
cast, Dec. 4, 1996, available in LEXIS News Library, BBCSWB tile.
6\ Cold War Remembered as Hanoi Blasts U.S. radio, REUTERS WORLD SERVICE, Dec. 10,
1996.
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Combinations of monitoring, so-called peace broadcasting (neu-
tral, outside efforts to provide information), and jamming are now
emerging as elements of formulae for preventing conflict and pro-
moting healing after war and genocide. li2
In Cambodia in the mid-1990s, when the international com-
munity entered, there was little in the way of indigenous media and
U.N. radio was created to ensure that there was a "fair" information
source during the first elections. But afterwards, the U.N. radio
ceased. In order to fill what was perceived. as a void, Radio Free
Asia sought to establish an FM relay station in Phnom Penh.li:\ The
Hun Sen controlled Information Ministry agreed to allow the sta-
tion, but before the agreement was concluded and the station actu-
ally took concrete shape, the station's authorization was put in
doubt. Newspapers charged Hun Sen with fear of RFA and VOA
broadcasts "because the RFA broadcast constitutes a powerful mis-
sile that can destroy all tactics conducted by the dictatorial clique
in the twinkling of an eye." With RFA's FM broadcast in Phnom
Penh, "people can be informed immediately of what the Hun Sen
government has done whether for national development or na-
tional destruction." The argument, hyperbole aside, was that RFA
would provide pluralism of views:.
Everyone is now aware that Hun Sen and his entourage have
spent millions of dollars on FM radio stations to disseminate
misleading information aimed at deceiving the people. Most of
the radio stations controlled by Hun Sen-except Beehive Ra-
dio-represent the voice of injustice, immorality, and dictator-
ship. Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority of people do not
believe the news broadcasts by those stations because RFA or
VOA rectifies them promptly. This is the reason why Hun Sen
and his cronies have revoked their decision to let the RFA set up
a relay station in Phnom Penh.li4 . '
In Rwanda, the international broadcasting community was ini-
tially paralyzed as to how it should affect media space where media
agents were largely responsible for genocide.65 There was a resi-
due of shame and resulting inertia partly because of earlier inac-
tion, partly because of the horrendous complexity of the post-
62 See Metzl. supra note 2.
63 Government Plans to Ban U.S.funded RFA Criticized, Samleng Yuveakchon Khmer, Apr. 8,
1999, reprinted in World Broadcast Information, Apr. 23, 1999, available in LExis News
Library, BBCSWB file.
64 See supra note 21.
65 See Linda Kirschke, Organization, Broadcasting Genocide: Censorship, Propaganda and
State Sponsored Violence in Rwanda 1990-1994, London: Article 19/International Center
Against Censorship, 1996.
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genocide society, and partly because some journalists, trained by
the West in the skills of radio production and audience building,
had used those skills during the genocide to drum up fervor for
the Hutu to slaughter the Tutsi. Later, as a relatively minor contri-
bution, in the wake of genocide, the BBC World Service launched
an FM relay in Kigali in March 1998. External donors including the
U.N. High Commission for Refugees, the British government's De-
partment for International Development, Christian Aid, the British
Red Cross, and Save the Children Fund funded this special service
for the Great Lakes region (Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic
Republic of the Congo). Included in the program would be news
and current affairs for the region, development and rehabilitation
features and messages from refugees and displaced people. Be-
cause of "growing competition from local, national, and interna-
tional broadcasters and satellite television and the Internet," said
the BBC World Service Managing Director, "it is no longer enough
for the BBC to broadcast on shortwave alone; we have to be more
accessible to our audience, more relevant and more aware of our
listeners' needs."66
International broadcasters, in these newly altered conflict res-
olution and peacekeeping roles, often must work with concurrent
efforts to block disfavored communications, altering the position
of the international community. Especially in the contexts of
threatened genocide or potentially large-scale deprivation of
human rights, different forms of intervention have been found
warranted. These modern interventions are even more drastic than
jamming and not within the standard definition. The airwaves have
to be-or so it seems-affected negatively and positively. In the
bombing of transmitters in Mghanistan, before the international
broadcaster took over the air space, local transmitters were de-
stroyed on the ground that they were used for the spewing of
speech that incited or intensified conflict.67 In another example, in
May 1999 at the height of the conflict in Yugoslavia, the Eutelsat
Board of Directors discontinued transmitting the Radio-TV Serbia
(RTS) satellite program and thus made RTS inaccessible in Euro-
66 USA, NATO Said to Be Building Ring Around Serbia, TAr'HUG NEWS AGENCY, Aug. 13,
1999, available in LEXIS News Library, BBCSWB file.
67 Sufficiently similar to be cited here was the decision of Israel to destroy the building
of the Palestinian Broadcasting Corporation in January 2002. Palestinian leaders and inter-
national media watchdogs condemned the Israeli attack on the Ramallah headquarters.
Israel had contended that Palestinian radio and television incited violence. The destruc-
tion of the Palestinian broadcasting headquarters renewed a debate on the propriety of
attacking civilian-operated media outlets. Analysis: Israel Destroys Palestinian Broadcasting HQ
in West Bank, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts Gan. 24, 2002): BBC Monitoring
Research.
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pean countries.68
In November 1999 the United States reiterated its displeasure
that Israel continued to permit the Yugoslav authorities to broad-
cast RTS on an Israeli satellite. Mter the Secretary of State raised
the question, the private Israeli company Spacecom, which owns
the Amos-l satellite, announced that it stopped broadcasting the
Yugoslav program, following orders from the Israeli government.69
According to the Serbian authorities, "the decision [to discontinue
RTS broadcasts] is a culmination of the hypocrisy of the policy pur-
sued by Western powers, which in words urge the freedom of the
media while most grossly preventing the flow of information in the
world and, thereby, consciously violating the Eutelsat founding
principles."70
For the first time since the founding of Eutelsat, one of its
members has been denied the right of transmission of its pro-
grams, which poses a most serious threat to others, too. Today it is
Serbia and it is only a question of who will be the next. The Eutel-
sat Board of Directors have explained their decision by saying they
wanted to prevent the spreading of religious and national hatred,
which they are in fact doing by their own decision.
There are many who suggest that the international community
should have jammed "hate" programming or programming incit-
ing conflict in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, this being the
other side of the power to inject a new set of images into a desig-
nated context. This is the face of force of the Declaration of
Human Rights, the sword and the blunderbuss of the right of citi-
zens to receive and impart information about their civil condition.
V. TRANSFORMATIONS AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES
One important question is how international broadcasting is
affected by new technologies. There are innovations, but one could
also conclude that external broadcasting remains a primarily low-
tech enterprise and that radio, and shortwave radio at that, is its
most effective tool. In the post-war review of how to build up M-
ghan media, one approach was to sponsor a series of low power
transmitters that would reach local areas rather than seek a na-
68 Of course, this was during an armed intervention. See Eutelsat Decision 'Culmination of
Hypocrisy', TANJUG NEWS AGENCY, May 27, 1999, available in LEXIS News Library, BBCSWB
file.
69 USA 'Embittered' by RTS broadcasts on Israeli Satellite, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts
(Nov. 12, 1999): World Broadcast Information; Yugoslavia/Israel/USA; WBI/0046/\VB.
Source: Monitoring research (Nov. 4, 1999).
70 See supra note 27.
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tional audience. Changes, such as the expansion of VOA into tele-
vision, satellite feeds to a large number of independent or state-
owned FM radio stations around the world, the introduction of
monitoring, jamming, and broadcast aircraft as part of a means of
introducing messages, often during war, and, of course, the turn to
the Internet have suggested that modernization is necessary and
useful. But do these new efforts make a difference? Do new tech-
nologies make states particularly permeable to the extensions of
other states, and have the sending states used new technologies in
ways that have affected the strategies of international broadcasters?
The geopolitical and technological changes affecting interna-
tional broadcasting in the 1990s have been substantial. Partly, there
was a shift from reliance on traditional shortwave and mediumwave
transmissions. An increasing number of intended recipients were
turning to TV, the Internet, and to national and local FMs carrying
relays of the international broadcasts tolerable to the host country.
The international broadcasters, like their domestic counterparts,
have had to learn new skills and new modes of attracting atten-
tion.71 There is a greater stress on "multimedia" in this new envi-
ronment, and competition for listeners' attention has increased in
the emerging multichannel world. A shift in the nature of conflict
itself to internal war and hostilities rather than conflict between
nations has affected the role of media.
As to technology; one observer has noted, "The Internet and
digital transmission by satellite will make obsolete the old short-
wave broadcast system, with its expensive and cumbersome relay
transmitter stations."72 Without question, the VOA, Radio Free
Asia, and all other international broadcasters are seeking to adjust
to an Internet-literate world. The then-chairman of the IBB's
Board of Governors, Marc Nathanson, was quoted as saying, "Tech-
nology of shortwave is outmoded. We need to get into modern
technology. Congress needs to fund it as we go to satellites, the
Internet, and FM broadcasting."
Listeners with access to the Internet in China, Serbia, or Rus-
sia can download radio broadcasts in real time. Because of the de-
mography of Internet use, American and other foreign global
broadcasters, such as the BBC and Germany's Deutsche Welle, will
find an audience slightly different from what they had before, with
an increasing proportion of academics, students, and government
officials. Television is also an important altered venue. Though in-
71 See Olechowska and Aster, Challenges for International Broadcasting V. 214-257.
72 See Hopkins. supra note 8.
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ternational broadcasting remains substantially a radio service, the
number of radio listeners declines whereever television is available.
Consider the adjacent states of Indian Bihar and Uttar Pradesh.
According to VOA research studies in 2000, in Bihar, the BBC ob-
tained a 20 percent listening rate for their shortwave broadcasts. In
Uttar Pradesh, which has five cities of national consequence with
available television, the BBC only had a four percent rate. It is pos-
sible that other factors related to urban life affected this result, but
generally, shortwave radio listening generally recedes under pres-
sure from television. For the VOA, this means that its competition
may not be primarily the BBC World Service but, instead and ever
increasingly, television and local radio, especially FM. Consider it
as a market for attention. International radio listening is tradition-
ally an evening activity. Families listen during what is commercially
considered to be prime time. As television becomes more generally
available it draws these families away from the international radio
hearth.
Direct-to-home (or to village) satellite television has the poten-
tial in some circumstances to transform institutions of interna-
tional broadcasting. It certainly requires that the audience has
both satellite dishes and is information?poor or informa-
tion?denied. This combination may not frequently exist. Where it
does, or where information poverty relates to information about
local events, a third condition is that individuals feel that they can
watch without real fear of int~rdiction. Iran became a case that sat-
isfied these conditions. Satellite radio has promise, but to date it
predominantly means distribution of a radio signal by satellite to a
terrestrial rebroadcaster. A great deal of planning and experimen-
tation-along the lines of WorldSpace's ambitious plans in Mrica,
Asia, and the Caribbean-must be undertaken before there are
satellites regularly and effectively distributing programs directly to
radios. Problems with shadowing in target regions proved difficult
to resolve, as was the cost of radios that can receive direct from
satellite. Digitalization is not yet a functional low-cost option for
receivers, although WorldSpace has conducted .experiments to pro-
vide for a dedicated service for digital radio receivers in Mrica.
In late 1996 and early 1997, then?President of Serbia
Slobodan Milosevic cracked down on independent media during
opposition rallies protesting his regime's annulment of opposition
victories in fourteen municipal election contests across Serbia. The
BBC, VOA, and RFE all sought to fill the information vacuum.
VOA not only expanded its Serbian language broadcasts on short-
wave and medium wave to reach more listeners in Yugoslavia, but it
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also leased leased time on a Eutelsat TV transponder to simulcast
its Serbian language radio broadcasts within ten days after
Milosevic attempted to close down independent Serbian radio sta-
tion B-92.73 The Serbian language VOA radio-TV simulcasts were
pioneering efforts for planned expansion in VOA-TV program-
ming of the late 1990s and beyond.
The 1999 NATO campaign against Yugoslavia provides addi-
tional insights into adaptation to new or different technologies.
During the campaign, the Yugoslav government closed down all
foreign broadcasting and banned the retransmission of interna-
tional broadcasters on domestic radio stations to the extent they
could. In October 1998, during the period of threat of NATO at-
tacks, the then Serbian Information Minister Aleksandar Vucic is-
sued a decree that banned the "rebroadcasting of foreign media
reports that aim to spread fear, panic, or defeatism." He singled
out Deutsche Welle for its "numerous fabrications" about events in
Kosovo and claimed that the Voice of America was conducting a
propaganda campaign against Serbia:
This is a way to prevent the psychological-propaganda war which
some foreign countries have waged against us either by broad-
casting their programs or parts of their programs on domestic
radio and TV stations or by directly or indirectly influencing the
editorial concepts of certain media companies, especially if this
originated from countries which are directly threatening to use
military force against US. 74
With the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe's broad-
casting taken off the air on stations inside Serbia, in April 1999 the
chair of the International Broadcasting Board announced that the
U.S. government had decided to join in building the "ring around
Serbia." The decision was to deploy FM transmitters so that U.S.
agencies could get signals into Serbia and communicate to the Ser-
bian people. The FM transmitters would beam into Serbia from
surrounding countries though, at the time, international broad-
casting officials were not specific about which countries were in-
volved. The FM transmitters were constructed with funds provided
by USAID. Though FM is of limited range, is problematic in hilly
terrain, and is more vulnerable to jamming than shortwave, the
policymakers resorted to FM because it is the radio medium of
73 Several hundred thousand homes in Yugoslavia were equipped with satellite dishes
capable of receiving international TV signals independently of local cable or terrestrial
channels controlled by the government.
74 Inf01mation Minister Defends Relay Ban, TA~JUG NEWS AGENCY, Oct. 10, 1998, reprinted in
World Broadcast Information, Oct. 16, 1998, available in LEXIS News Library, BBCSWB file.
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choice in Serbia.75 The construction of any strategy to transmit FM
signals required a complicated effort to obtain rights to use of
transmitters. In the case of Serbia, use was made of facilities in Ko-
sovo and Republika Srpska, the Bosnian Serb entity.
In the summer of 2001, the United Kingdom announced the
curtailment of shortwave transmissions of' their international
broadcasting arm to the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zea-
land and the Pacific Islands. Listeners instead would have to access
the World Service on the Internet or listen to a limited service re-
broadcast on FM by local stations. The move ended the tradition,
established in 1932 when the Empire Service, as it was then called,
first went on air, of punctuating each hour with the familiar signa-
ture "This is London" and providing many listeners with their first
live voice from a distant land.76 The Voice of America cut back on
its shortwave services as well, but expanded its Internet content.
The context in which the BBC World Service and the Voice of
America functioned had changed, and changed dramatically. New
technologies, now including the Internet in specified locales, had
greater audiences than traditional modes for distributing their
messages. Virtually for the first time, because of the boundary-less
nature of the Internet, a Congressional-imposed rule that the VOA
could not be directed at a U.S. domestic audience was technologi-
cally threatened in a meaningful way. There was muttering at that
and other decisions to alter priorities. But times and technologies
had made some rules unenforceable.
VI. TRANSFORMATIONS AND SEPTEMBER 11
There is little question that the events of September 11, 2001
had a profound impact on all of public diplomacy, including the
institutions of international broadcasting. The war in Mghanistan
was a moment in which military strategies were rethought and new
ideas tested. Similarly, it would be a critical episode in assessing the
significance of longstanding doctrines in the arena of propaganda
and use of information. There had long been talk of a Revolution
in Military Mfairs (RMA), but rarely discussion of a Revolution in
Public Diplomacy.77 Now there were the elements and the demand
7" u.s. to Surround Serbia with FM Transmitters, Voice of America broadcast, Apr. 10,
1999, reprinted in World Broadcast Information, Apr. 16, 1999, available in LEXIS News Li-
brary, BBCSWB file.
76 BBC World Seroice to Cut Back Broadcasts, DAILY TELEGRAPH, May 26, 2001.
77 On the military side, an RMA occurred when there was a fundamental shift in the
nature of warfare brought about by a radical change in technologies accompanied by a
change in military doctrine and organizational and operational concepts. See MAcGREGOR
KNox AND WILLIAMSON MURRAY, THE DYNAMICS OF MILITARY REVOLUTION: 1300-2050
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for performance that might lead to further transformations in in-
ternational broadcasting. Previous scrutiny-arising out of the end
of the Cold War, the opportunity presented by new technologies,
the demands of the ethnic conflicts, and the challenges put by
young critics like Jamie Metzl-had shaken the institutions of inter-
national broadcasting but not fundamentally altered their
behavior.
In short order, various underpinnings of the classic commit-
ment to international broadcasting were questioned, not out of in-
difference, but rather out of a new sense of necessity that
propaganda goals were vital to national security.
One such underpinning had been the celebrated (though re-
peatedly questioned) commitment to objectivity by the Voice of
America as that term came to be interpreted in U.S. journalism. A
VOA charter, drafted in 1960 and signed into law in 1976 by Presi-
dent Gerald Ford, addressed the need to protect VOA's integrity
(an ambiguous need to maintain a profile that would relay the na-
tional message while still upholding national values like impartial-
ity) .78 The Charter provided as its first principle that "VOA will
serve as a consistently reliable and authoritative source of news.
VOA news will be accurate, objective, and comprehensive."79 The
harsh reality of September 11 caused an immediate conflict with
this principle. A little more than a week after the suicide attacks,
William Safire, the influential columnist for The New York Times,
questioned the utility of adherence to the principle of objectivity as
practiced by the VOA. He skewered "evenhanded journalists"
there, and mockingly condemned "fine impartiality" as "the wrong
voice" for a state-sponsored international broadcaster in wartime.
Prompting Safire's ire, the VOA had included a discussion of vari-
ous views, including those of Taliban leaders, in a program con-
cerning the potential war. Safire quoted the VOA's news director
as stating that "for the agency to remain 'a credible news organiza-
tion,' such interviews with terrorists 'will be part of our balanced,
accurate, objective, and comprehensive reporting, providing our
listeners with both sides of the story.' "80
(2001); JAMES DER DERIAN, VIRTUOUS WAR; MAPPING THE MILITARy-INDUSTRIAL-MEDIA-EN-
TERTAINMt:NT NETWORK (2001)
78 Pub. L. No. 94-350 (1976).
79 The other two principles were as follows: (2) VOA will represent America, not any
single segment of American society, and will therefore present a balanced and comprehen-
sive prqjection of significant American thought and institutions; and (3) VOA will present
the policies of the United States clearly and effectively, and will also present responsible
discussions and opinion on these policies. Note the innate conflict between the third prin-
ciple and the first.
80 William Satire, Equal Time for Hitler, N.V. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2001, at 31.
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For Safire and the many who identified with what he wrote,
the irrelevance of adherence to the Charter's first principle was
clear: "Which US government broadcaster should be charged," he
wrote, "with stirring anger among Afghans at rulers eager to bring
further devastation to their country? That mission of countering
Radio Shariat's propaganda should go to RFE/RL, the 'radio free'
outfit experienced in acting as a surrogate free press in repressive
nations like Iran, Iraq, and China."
"In the climate of today's undeclared war," Safire had con-
cluded, "private media in democracies are free to take either or
neither side, but U.S. taxpayer-supported broadcasting is supposed
to be on our side." The Safire column created its own volcano of
additional objections and soon combined with a second incident in
which the State Department placed pressure on the VOA not to
feature an exclusive interview with a leading Taliban figure, Mullah
Mohamed Omar, even though it was, by all accounts, an important
news story.Sl A famed characteristic ofVOA-State Department rela-
tionships had been violated, a corollary to the principle of objectiv-
ity: the existence of a "firewall" which was supposed to protect
Voice programmers from intervention from Executive Branch offi-
cials. The VOA had striven to present itself to the world as largely
insulated from political control. Yet at this moment of national se-
curity fears, the qualities that VOA considered vital to its interna-
tional reputation seemed to be ephemeral, incapable of the
significant anxieties of the moment.
And then there was a third kind of faltering. During the Af-
ghan War, the VOA was broadcast from military aircraft, the Com-
mander Solo planes that were substituting the VOA signal for the
destroyed Taliban radio. The VOA had steadfastly refused during
the Gulf War and Kosovo crisis to permit its programming to be
8l An account of the event was presented by the VOA itself:
VOA originally planned to air the [Mullah Omar] report on September 21.
The State Department typically does not see VOA reports in advance of their
broadcast, somehow State Department officials found out about this story and
objected vehemently to some members of the Broadcasting Board of Gover-
nors, which oversees all U.S. government international broadcasting. VOA se-
nior management decided to hold the story pending an interview with the
former Afghan King and other experts. Most VOA employees learned about
this incident last Sunday, September 23, when they read about it in the Wash-
ington Post. This past week, over 200 VOAjournalists and broadcasters signed a
petition which began with a statement made on VOA's first day of broadcasting,
Feb. 24, 1942, during World War II. 'Daily at the time, we shall speak to you
about America and the war-the news may be good or bad-we shall tell you
the truth.' The petition concluded: 'This censorship sets a most unfortunate
precedent and damages our credibility with our worldwide audience.'
Voice of America, "USA/Afghanistan: State Department's 'Regret' at VOA's Taleban Inter-
view," BBC Monitoring World Media, Oct. 1.
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relayed via U.S. Defense Department aircraft or terrestrial "psywar"
stations. This policy, too, had been put in abeyance. For some,
these events were part of the process of conflict; for others it was a
further deterioration in the idea of independence.
Finally, a sign of all these pressures was that Congress, rarely
subtle when it is passionately in pursuit of newfound truths, tried,
instantaneously, to recast the international broadcasting structures.
Senator Joseph Biden, the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, proposed a half-billion dollar initiative for a satellite
television channel that would compete with AI Jazeera to reach
"younger Muslims who are seen as anti-American." By 2003, this
took the form of a $30 million appropriation. Congress raced, as
well, to establish a new surrogate Radio Free Mghanistan at the
beginning of the U.S. bombing campaign. According to Congress-
man Ed Royce, this station was necessary "to do what was done with
Radio Free Europe in Poland and Czechoslavkia. When we talk
with leaders [there], they say that the hearts and minds of those
people in those countries were turned by the opportunity to listen
daily to a radio broadcast which explained what was actually hap-
pening in their society."82
In addition, there was enthusiasm for a new Middle East Radio
Network (MERN), now called Radio Sawa, targeted at young Arabs
with a "musical mix [that] will run from Madonna and the Back-
street Boys to popular Middle Eastern Singers like Egypt's Amr
Diab and Cheb Mami of AIgeria."83 The origins of such an ap-
proach can be found in the months prior to September 11 but it
was rushed into prominence as a result. If implemented, MERN
would constitute the embodiment of a Revolution in Public Diplo-
macy, especially when joined with other emerging stratagems to
"rebrand" the United States. MERN would have radical implica-
tions for the VOA and international broadcasting.
Radio Sawa was the brainchild of Norman Pattiz, a highly suc-
cessful radio entrepreneur (he was the major shareholder in West-
wood One-a large-scale information and entertainment radio
content supplier) and a member of the International Broadcasting
Bureau's Board of Governors. Because of his background in the
commercial radio industry, Pattiz had been asked to co-chair the
committee charged with undertaking an extensive review of the ef-
fectiveness of the VOA. What he learned, he said in post Septem-
82 Congressman Ed Royce, Press Release, Nov. 7, 2001.
83 US Dials Up Radio Network to Reach Young Muslims, WALL ST.]', Nov. 27, 20m, at A24.
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ber 11 testimony before the U.S. Congress, "shocked" him.84 "I was
astounded to see how poorly we did in areas of vital concern to
U.S. foreign policy." He was disturbed, especially, by listening rates
in the Middle East. He faulted the VOA for having "no targeted
programming for the region, just a generic, one-size-fits-all Arabic
stream." He considered the distribution mechanisms outdated and
fatally flawed: "We had no local FM or regional AM distribution,
the radio channels of choice,just out-dated shortWave. We scarcely
had a presence in the region, only a few very small news bureaus.
In short, we really had no chance of being successful."
The remedies he outlined could be seen as a significant cri-
tique of international broadcasting as it had previously developed.
First, as have the commercial broadcasters who now dominate U.S.
radio space, the Radio Sawa broadcasters would have more specific
demographic analysis and objectives. "We're going to know the au-
dience and program to that audience." For the new network, the
determination was that the target would not be the elite of the tar-
get society, not an older politically involved audience, but "the new
young mainstream of educated Arabs under 30 and the emerging
Arab leadership."
Not surprisingly, the techniques to be used would approxi-
mate those of the urban stations, which Pattiz had helped develop.
His solution to VOA's problems-in its broadest terms-was for
U.S. international broadcasting to use "the same techniques and
technologies that drive U.S. commercial media today." These
would include an approach to radio as "a medium of formats not
shows." The U.S. listener tunes "to a particular station because we
like what that station offers overall." Modern radio is constructed
so that there are stations known for the kind of music they play,
thematically, all day long. These are highly engineered formats de-
signed to attract and keep audience.
Such a model would be radically different from the program-
ming schedule of the traditional VOA. U.S. international broad-
casting, Pattiz contended, "still uses radio largely the way it was
used fifty years ago. The 60 language services present collections of
programs, packaged into programming blocks of varying duration.
Not only does this sound dated but it robs our broadcasting of one
key advantage of formatted radio-a clear identity the audience
can relate to and easily recognize." To accomplish his results, there
84 "Rethinking US Public Diplomacy," Committee on International Relations. United
States Congress. Nov. 14,2001 (statement of Norman]. Pattiz). All quotes by Mr. Pattiz in
this section are from this Statement.
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would need to be a different organizing mentality, different staff-
ing, and a different set of incentives. The content and approach to
content would be transformed, just as American radio was trans-
formed by the rise of highly managed, highly targeted, ratings-sen-
sative radio that emerged after the 1970s. Genres would change,
with implications, probably, for competition among international
broadcasters, with new satellite services and local commercial
competitors.
In his testimony, Pattiz argued that a specially designed MERN
would "present a consistent, uniform format that achieves a clear
identity the audience can relate to and easily recognize." His words
recalled urban radio in Detroit or "easy listening" formats in Los
Angeles. "We're going to be a force in the market-on the air 24/7
on multiple channels that the audience uses and that we own. Be-
ing on around the clock establishes a fixed, prominent profile as
opposed to sporadic broadcasts at different times during the day.
We want to maintain a constant on-air presence and be available
whenever the audience wants us." The nature of the target audi-
ence would affect format and content. "We're going to attract an
audience by creatively using entertainment and music. We have to
be realistic." His indication of ownership suggests a different tech-
nology of distribution, with more local transmitters and local FM
or AM outlets obtained by the U.S. international broadcaster.
A significant question would be the status of news and infor-
mation, areas that have been central to the VOA's existence. Not-
ing that the target audiences for the Middle East Radio Network
would be young adults, Pattiz argued,
They are not news-seekers first and foremost. We have to attract
them with the programming they want to hear and drop in the
news and information we want them to get. This means strategic
use of music and entertainment. A major competitive advantage
of the Middle East Radio Network is access to specialized music
researchers who use state-of-the-art techniques to stay up to the
minute on changing audience preferences. Since music will be a
vital to our programming appeal, it must be absolutely current.
Pattiz might have had in mind, as a model, Radio Maximum, a
decade-old radio station in Moscow. The station had been devel-
oped, in part, by Bert Kleinman, who was selected by Pattiz and the
International Broadcasting Board of Governors in 2001 to develop
a "master plan" for MERN. Chosen, apparently, because he pos-
sessed "unique capabilities" in providing ethnic- and Middle East-
specific broadcast consultative services, Kleinman would provide
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"branding and marketing strategies." A joint venture between the
U.S.-owned Storyfirst Communications and the Moscow News pub-
lishing house until it was sold in 2001, Radio Maximum was num-
ber six in the Moscow market and number two in St. Petersburg
with a format described by its managing director Mikhail Eidelman
as "cool rock and smart pop." The strategy is to have an image as "a
young energetic station for forward-looking people." Targeting stu-
dents and young businessmen, mostly age 18-30 who have a higher
than average income, Eidelman sought an audience better edu-
cated, "generally more open-minded to the world," very much the
equivalent of the desired demography in the Middle East. Signifi-
cantly, according to the managing director, a characteristic of the
programming strategy is: "No politics, no hard news, no sport, only
short reports with a good sense of humor. Our audience has
enough brains not to be told what to think?they are well-informed
people who can get other kinds of news elsewhere. We are an en-
tertainment station. "85
All of this suggests why Pattiz' vision for the Radio Sawa con-
tains seeds of transforming change. Pattiz foresaw his innovation as
breaking through the traditional distinctions between the Voice of
America and the so-called surrogate radios. Debates about interna-
tional broadcasting in the United States, as we have seen, have
been filled with vicious divisions. between those (essentially the
Voice of America) who contend that the task is to provide an objec-
tive and impartial view of the United States in the world; and those,
the surrogates, who deploy international broadcasting to provide a
view of local news in the target society as framed by those employed
by the surrogates. .
Pattiz's vision transcends this divide by relying on a new
model, one that would draw on commercial counterparts to over-
come any ideological obstacle. There would be "a global, research-
driven U.S. government broadcasting network" that fulfills the mis-
sions of both the surrogate radios and the Voice of America by
broadening the distribution mechanisms and bringing them under
one mode of control. He predicted a time when the component
parts of current U.S. international broadcasting efforts-surrogates
and VOA- would be content providers supplying programming.
This network would be maintained by the International Broadcast-
ing Bureau, which also operates under the Broadcasting Board of
Governors and has had since 1994 the function of consolidating
broadcasting operations. Presumably, the network would also be
85 Moscow's Music Radio Glasnost, MUSIC & MEDIA Aug. 25, 2001, at 7.
HeinOnline -- 21 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 84 2003
84 CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT [Vol. 21:51
able to gain content from other suppliers if the task of reaching
the target audience would be enhanced.
The war in Mganistan and the sharper focus on hearts and
minds, rendered the model of the Radio Sawa more likely to be
achieved. It would provide, if all the aspirations of Norman Pattiz
were to be realized, an astonishing, sweeping change in U.S. inter-
national broadcasting. It would bring the techniques of the market-
place much more to the fore, and with it, radical changes in genre
and technique. The VOA office warrens of displaced diasporic dis-
sidents, the Pashtos, the Serbs, the Azerbaijans, would find that
their preserves were severely jolted and their places taken by the
inevitable MBAs and managers with experience in commercial ra-
dio. As Pattiz concluded his testimony: "We know how to make US
international broadcasting robust in every quarter of the world. We
simply have to use the same broadcasting techniques and technolo-
gies that drive the best commercial broadcasting today. These have
worked everywhere they have been tried."
CONCLUSION
The events of September 11 and, afterwards, the war in Iraq,
brought to the foreground debates over the future of public diplo-
macy and international broadcasting. These debates sharpened an
understanding of the interest one society has in the media space of
others. There are few other contexts in which there is so direct a
discussion of a national purpose to alter the mix of voices, to affect
the market for loyalties, to achieve greater civic participation in tar-
get societies and, finally, to win over hearts and minds. If there is a
"revolution in public diplomacy," international broadcasting will
be one critical site for its implementation. The move may be to-
ward "rebranding," to use a current hot-button phrase, from an
emphasis on a general process of representing the United States to
one far more instrumental in its emphasis on specific content. In-
ternational broadcasting may move from being an active propo-
nent of the relationship of media to democracy to a function more
closely tied to issues of media and global security. The very institu-
tions of international broadcasting could begin to mimic their
commercial counterparts. There may be a move from news to en-
tertainment, from "objective and impartial" reportage to promo-
tion of a particular culture or style. New technologies, new genres,
new kinds of partnerships?all these will certainly characterize the
future of international broadcasting, as we have seen in the exam-
ple of the Middle Eastern Radio Network. The revered Canadian
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activist and writer Graham Spry had a relevant warning (though he
was speaking of domestic public service broadcasting): "To trust
this weapon [the shaping of public opinion through electronic me-
dia] to advertising agents and interested corporations seems the
uttermost folly. "86
86 Letter from Graham Spry, 1931, quoted in Robert M. McChesney, Graham Spry and the
Future of Public Broadcasting, 24 CANADIAN J. COMM. (1999).
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